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ABSTRACT Asexuality is overlooked in the philosophical literature and in wider society. Such
neglect produces incomplete or inaccurate accounts of romantic life and harms asexual people.
We develop an account of asexuality to redress this neglect and enrich discussion of romantic
life. Asexual experiences are diverse. Some asexual people have sex; some have romantic rela-
tionships in the absence of sex. We accept the common definition of asexuality as the absence
of sexual attraction and explain how sexual attraction and sexual desire differ by giving an
affordance-like account of sexual attraction. Armed with that distinction, we show that asexu-
ality is clearly different from celibacy or disorders of desire and that some existing philosophical
theories of sexual desire struggle to accommodate asexual sexuality. We then build on asexual
testimony about the diversity of non-sexual attractions to answer two common objections lev-
elled at asexual romance: that romantic relationships require sexual attraction or that sex in
the absence of sexual attraction is insufficiently focused on someone as an individual. Finally,
we describe some of the ways asexuality has been erased or denigrated in society, and the
specific injustices and harms that result.
Asexuality isn’t a complex. It’s not a sickness. It’s not an automatic sign of
trauma. It’s not a behavior. It’s not the result of a decision. It’s not a chastity
vow or an expression that we are ‘saving ourselves’. We aren’t by definition
religious. We aren’t calling ourselves asexual as a statement of purity or moral
superiority. We’re not amoebas or plants. We aren’t automatically gender
confused, anti-gay, anti-straight, anti-any-sexual orientation, anti-woman,
anti-man, anti-any-gender or anti sex. We aren’t automatically going through
a phase, following a trend, or tying to rebel. We aren’t defined by prudish-
ness. We aren’t calling ourselves asexual because we failed to find a suitable
partner. We aren’t necessarily afraid of intimacy. And we aren’t asking for
anyone to ‘fix’ us. (Decker, 2015, p. 3)
1. Introduction
Asexual people do not experience sexual attraction to others. But many asexuals have
romantic relationships, and some engage in sexual activity. Asexuals make up a group
of approximately 1% to 6% of the population.1 With a few exceptions, however, asex-
uals and their experiences have been overlooked by philosophers. This neglect is
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problematic in several ways. Theoretically, our understanding of sexuality and roman-
tic life can be enriched and challenged by attention to asexuality. Practically, the theo-
retical neglect of asexuality has contributed to its everyday erasure and denigration
which continues to harm asexual people.
In this article, we take modest steps towards reversing this neglect. Our task is partly
that of situating asexuality within the existing philosophical discourse about sexuality
and romantic love; partly that of documenting the specific harms experienced by asex-
ual people; and partly that of illustrating the research which needs to be done. Our
methodology is simple. We write as two allosexual people—that is, people who experi-
ence sexual attraction—and so we shall presuppose that asexual people have accurately
described their lived experiences. We provide no independent argument for these
claims, but any empirically minded approach to sexual phenomena ought to avoid dis-
trusting sexual minorities in the absence of overriding reasons. Some of the concepts
used here are subject to debate and clarification, but the core distinctions we describe
are widely attested in both the research literature and amongst asexual communities.2
In Section 2, we provide an account of asexuality which sets out its core features,
distinguishes it from celibacy and disorders of desire, and shows how it is compatible
with the pursuit of a romantic life. A distinction between the experience of sexual
desire, and of sexual attraction, is central to this account, but readers may worry that
such a distinction is implausible. In Section 3, we take this concern seriously and show
how asexuality is more compatible with some philosophical accounts of sexual desire
than others. Even if sexual desire and sexual attraction can come apart, the latter is
often assumed to be especially important. In Section 4, therefore, we focus on attrac-
tion. We draw attention to the idea, central to asexual discourse, that attraction is a
rich and diverse phenomenon which must not be reduced to sexual attraction. Recog-
nizing this is important in several ways. First, neglect of attraction’s diversity partly
explains why asexuality has been denied or neglected. Second, it provides us with
resources to dispel the myth that asexuality is incompatible with romantic love.
Finally, it may help address the broader normative concern that sex in the absence of
sexual attraction is morally problematic. With this understanding of asexuality in
place, we then turn, in Section 5, to describe some of the ways asexuality has been
erased or denigrated in society and the specific injustices and harms that result.
2. Understanding Asexuality
Asexuality is standardly defined as the absence of sexual attraction to other people.3 As
will become clear later, ‘asexuality’ is a misleading term. Perhaps something clumsier,
like ‘obtraction’, would better capture what is central to asexual experience; namely,
the absence of distinctly sexual attraction to others, not necessarily the absence of sex-
ual desire, or sexual activity, or other kinds of attraction.
To understand what asexuality is, we need to define sexual attraction. To do that,
we first need a general understanding of attraction. But attraction is hard to define.
For example, asexuality researcher Anthony Bogaert describes attraction as ‘that rather
basic, even primal, lure that draws us to someone or something’.4
This notion of a ‘lure’ should not be cashed out in terms of desire, although it is
closely connected to desiring. This is because desires are more closely connected to
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action than attraction.5 Instead, the phenomenon of attraction is akin to sensitivity to
affordances. Affordances are opportunities for action within a specific context which are
relative to our existing interests and capacities.6 Action, here, does not just include
physical acts, like approaching or touching, but mental actions too, like attending to
something, imagining, or reminiscing.7 Sensitivity to affordances has an automatic,
effortless, affective, and motivational phenomenology; certain things present opportu-
nities for action relative to us, and still others seem to actively invite action.8 Attraction
is akin to the latter phenomena. To be attracted to something is for that thing to soli-
cit a kind of engagement with it.
Attraction relates to our desires in complex ways. To see this, consider an example.
You are walking along an alpine trail on a hot day, turn a corner, and encounter a
cool pool. The pool is inviting. You are sensitive to it not only as an opportunity for a
refreshing swim, but as inviting one. This experience can be fleshed out in two ways.
To begin with, your attraction to the pool may result from a prior desire you have.
This desire could be basic, such as the desire to be cooler on a hot day, or more com-
plexly related to your projects, such as the desire to find and swim in every pool on
the mountain. Attraction to the pool is not necessary for you to have, or act on, the
desire to swim. You might have had the desire to swim anyway and may swim despite
being averse to the pool. (On account of its sharp edges, say.)
Although your attraction to the pool is not necessary for the desire to swim, it is
broadly sufficient to generate such a desire given your existing capacities and constitu-
tion, i.e. your ability to swim or lack of reasons to avoid water (things which are not
themselves reducible to desires.) Note, too, that the desire to swim need not result in
action; perhaps it’s late, and you need to reach shelter before nightfall.9
Understood by analogy with affordances, the phenomenon of attraction is a fairly
involuntary way of being inclined towards things around us. These inclinations either
focus our existing desires, finding specific pathways for them to result in action, or
they generate new desires. In both cases, attractions are relative to our specific makeup
and environment. A pool is not inviting simpliciter, but is inviting for you, or me;
unlike other attitudes, attraction is personal and context specific. Whilst we might be
able to desire some things on the basis of considered beliefs about them, our attrac-
tions generate desires that are tied more intimately to our emotions and ability to act.
Understood along these lines, to be sexually attracted to someone is to experience
them as ‘inviting’ certain forms of sexual engagement. To be clear, the notion of invi-
tation is metaphorical. We need not be literally asked to engage with someone sexually
to be sexually attracted to them, just as a pool does not ask us to go swimming.
Instead, sexual attraction invites certain kinds of sexual action, whether specific sexual
acts, or forms of sexual attention, imagination, and fantasy.
The precise pathways of action ‘invited’ by a sexually attractive person can depend
on our sexual desires and tastes. If we have a predilection for touching soft things,
because of the sensations we enjoy, then our attraction to him, with his soft hair, may
reflect that; analogous to the case where the prior desire to cool down means we find
that pool to be so inviting. Or we may find our sexual attractions elicit new desires
given our capacities and constitution. For example, we may be drawn to him, and be
surprised when we experience the desire to touch his muscular stomach, in part
because of our capacity for tactile imagination.
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Often, although not always, sexual attraction to people, unlike attraction to moun-
tain pools, is bound up with their agency. This is so both in the sense that our sexual
attraction may be responsive to what people say and do, and not just how they look,
but also because sexual attraction inclines us towards many kinds of joint action. For
me to find him sexually attractive, for instance, is for me to want us to act together
sexually in certain ways, and not for me to act on him. This is so even when the kinds
of action sexual attractions invite us toward are mental actions, like fantasising. People
often fantasise about doing things with others, not to them.
Asexuality is often labelled a sexual orientation.10 This is because asexuality is typi-
cally understood in terms of patterns of sexual attraction, rather than experiences of
desire, arousal, or sex, and because asexuality is stable and can feature as part of
someone’s identity. Viewed in this way, to be asexual is to be sexually attracted to no
one, just as to be bisexual is to be sexually attracted to men and women.
The matter of whether asexuality actually is an orientation is complex and shaped
by the fact that orientation discourse has social and political significance. Many asex-
ual people are uneasy with being defined negatively, or in terms of absence, so they
resist the idea that to be asexual is to lack a sexual orientation.11 In our current social
context, it is also easier to secure recognition and protection of a sexual identity if it
can be described as an orientation. This is because ‘orientation’ invokes a clear, dis-
crete, natural category. The political usefulness of orientation discourse is visible in
neighbouring discussions about the status of polyamory. Ann Tweedy, for example,
argues that polyamory should be described as an orientation in order to provide statu-
tory protections for polyamorous people.12 Some asexual people may have similar
aspirations.
But the strategic value of this move may be limited. Christian Klesse, also consider-
ing polyamory, argues that ‘as a normative trope, sexual orientation can be evoked to
police people’s desires and sexual behaviours and to reinforce rigid boundaries around
identities and communities’.13 Orientation discourse can therefore fail to reflect the
complexity of polyamorous experience. Similar concerns apply with equal force to the
application of orientation categories to asexuality, particularly if we view asexuality on
a spectrum (see below).
The political value of claiming asexuality to be a sexual orientation comes adrift
from theoretical disputes about the nature of sexual orientation. Klesse and other
scholars view sexual orientations as ‘western [social] constructs’, whereas others think
sexual orientations are anchored in biology. We lack space to intervene in this
debate.14 Asexual people have reasons to be wary of both theoretical standpoints. As
we argue in Section 5, asexuals struggle to secure recognition for their distinct identity
and are often erased or denigrated. On the one hand, then, if asexuality is viewed as a
socially constructed orientation, it might be taken less seriously at a time when asexual
people need recognition. On the other hand, the view that asexuality is biologically
predetermined could oversimplify and essentialise asexual experiences.15
A more intriguing possibility, however, is that consideration of asexuality will shape
how we think about sexual orientation. For example, Scherrer suggests that asexual
identities might be similar to those of polyamorous people, or practitioners of BDSM,
‘which include other dimensions of one’s sexuality that may be equally (or more)
important than gender of object choice’.16 If this is right, and given sufficient theoreti-
cal grounds to describe asexuality as a sexual orientation, then we would have reason
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to move away from thinking sexual orientations are orientation towards people of a
particular biological sex17 or of erotic experiences as being ‘fundamentally gendered’.18
Instead, we may end up thinking about sexual orientation in a different way altogether,
deprioritising sex and/or gender, and instead focussing on patterns of attraction
towards traits, behaviours, situations, or even individuals. This possibility chimes with
contemporary criticisms of orientation discourse, like Klesse’s, which suggest that sex-
ual orientation categories have been overly rigid, neglected sex and gender categories
beyond familiar binaries, and reflect Western values and dominance at the expense of
full appreciation of sexual and romantic life. More research needs to be done and
greater attention paid to the experiences of asexual people.
Since attraction to an object is not necessary for someone to have a desire to act on
or with that object, it is perfectly possible that asexual people have sexual desires and
may act sexually. People vary in their attitudes towards sexuality within the asexual
community. Some asexual people are repulsed by sex or the idea of themselves having
sex. Others are indifferent.
Importantly, however, some asexual people engage in sexual activity and many mas-
turbate.19 As with allosexual sexual activity, asexual people have sex for many rea-
sons.20 Some examples include the desire to benefit a partner, to feel close to a
partner, or to relax.21 We return to the intentional structure of such activity in the
next section.
The fact that some asexual people have sex or masturbate is partial support for a
general quadripartite distinction between experiencing sexual attraction, experiencing
sexual desire, experiencing sexual arousal, and experiencing sexual pleasure.22 What sex-
ual desire is, exactly, is contested, and we shall discuss this in the next section.
Broadly speaking, however, sexual desire is the urge to experience certain kinds of sex-
ual pleasure. Sexual pleasure is a qualitatively distinct experience that is a typical con-
sequence of sexual arousal when accompanied by sexual desire. Sexual arousal is the
physiological response in anticipation of, or engagement in, sexual activity.
Even without considering asexuality, it seems plausible that most of these four phe-
nomena can come apart, even if they are closely associated in typical cases (see
Table 1).
Noting that some asexual people have sex or masturbate only helps to reinforce the
plausibility of distinguishing between sexual desire and sexual attraction.
The above distinction helps us distinguish asexuality from celibacy and disorders of
desire. Asexuality is not celibacy where people refrain from sexual activity, usually
Table 1. Examples where desire, attraction, arousal, and pleasure may diverge
Present Absent Examples
Desire Attraction Masturbation, glory hole
Attraction Desire Some cases of immoral/taboo
sexuality74
Desire Arousal Erectile dysfunction
Arousal Desire and/or Attraction
and/or Pleasure
Sexual assault75
© 2020 The Authors. Journal of Applied Philosophy published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society for Applied
Philosophy
Asexuality 5
voluntarily, for two reasons. First, asexuals may engage in sexual activity in the
absence of sexual attraction. Second, celibates typically retain sexual attraction to
other people, as well as sexual desire, which is why celibacy is often a challenge.
Asexuality should be distinguished from purported disorders of sexual desire, such as
hypoactive sexual desire disorder where someone is distressed by their diminished sex-
ual drive.23 This is so for two reasons. First, asexual people may not have a dimin-
ished sexual drive at all. Second, the issue of whether someone is distressed by their
sexual life is orthogonal to the issue of whether they experience attraction or not.
Asexuality is sometimes defined as the absence of sexual attraction which is not expe-
rienced as distressing.24 But as C J DeLuzio Chasin notes, some allosexual people can
undergo changes to their sex drive without finding them distressing (indeed, these
changes might bring relief), and some asexual people may be distressed by their sexual
identity for exogenous reasons, especially in contexts where asexuality is marginalised,
erased, or subject to ridicule.25
Because asexuality is defined as the absence of sexual attraction, neither the concept
of an asexual celibate nor an asexual suffering from a desire disorder are pleonasms.
An asexual celibate is someone who does not act on their sexual desires; an asexual
with a desire disorder will find that their sexual drive has diminished, or increased, in
ways they find troubling. Neither person is sexually attracted to other people. To know
that someone is asexual, like knowing that someone is bisexual, tells us little about the
strength of frequency of their sexual desires and little about their motivations for hav-
ing sex if, and when, they choose to do so.
Our initial definition of asexuality can be clarified in light of recent sexuality
research which brings pressure to bear on stark binary orientations and weakens the
connections between orientations and behavior. Sexual attraction, desire, arousal, and
activity are often said to be fluid over the lifecycle and shaped by various contextual
features.26 This means that sexual identity can change over time and might be shaped
at least partly by environment. Sexual identity and behaviour are often productively
viewed in terms of broad spectra, and this is also true of asexuality.27
Two relevant descriptive categories on the asexual spectrum are greysexuality and
demisexuality.28 Greysexuals, in the grey area between asexuality and sexuality, experi-
ence sexual attraction infrequently. Demisexuals, in contrast, experience sexual attrac-
tion only after forming an emotional bond with someone. Although not fully asexual,
both groups find that attraction plays a marginal role in their lives. Attention to the
breadth of the asexual spectrum allows us to avoid a stark binary between the experi-
ence of sexual attraction and the absence of such an experience. By way of compar-
ison, a woman who is very occasionally attracted to women, but mainly attracted to
men, is not fully bisexual but would fall somewhere on a spectrum of bisexuality.
Cutting across the distinction between those who experience sexual attraction and
those who identify on the asexual spectrum is the separate distinction between those
who experience romantic attraction, i.e. those who want to have romantic relation-
ships, and those who do not and therefore consider themselves aromantic.29 Aromatic
people do not feel any pull to pursue romantic relationships or partnered life and are
satisfied with friendship and singledom. Aromanticism is more than a value preference
though and more akin to an orientation.30 Some asexuals are aromantic, and some
aromantics experience sexual attraction. Research suggests that between 16%31 and
25.9% of asexuals identify as aromantic.32 That a significant proportion of asexuals
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identify as aromantic could be an indication of the connection between sexual attrac-
tion and romantic love. However, there are two things to note here: first, even if the
proportion of asexuals who are aromantic is closer to 25%, this is still a minority; sec-
ond, it is possible that these asexuals are not interested in romantic life because they
associate romance with sex due to prevailing social norms. Were sex not so bound up
with romantic love, it is possible that fewer asexuals would also identify as aromantic.
Many people on the asexual spectrum pursue romantic relationships. Most of those
who do also have a romantic orientation and consider themselves heteroromantic,
homoromantic, biromantic and so on, i.e. romantically drawn to people of different,
same, or both sexes.33 Similarly, asexuals may identify as nonmonogamous for the
range of reasons that allosexuals (nonasexuals) might do so, such as the desire for
greater emotional fulfillment or the unwillingness to limit their ability to act on love
for different people.34 Asexual people may also embrace nonmonogamy as a way of
enabling beloved allosexual partners to be sexually fulfilled.
Interestingly, more women than men identify as asexual: in Bogaert’s 2004 sample,
only 29% of those who identified as asexual also identified as male.35 He provides sev-
eral possible explanations for this, including that some women might have internalised
the view that men should be more sexual than women or that women might be more
likely to see themselves as sexual objects rather than active participants in sex.36 More
research needs to be done into the relationship between gender and asexuality, but
gendered expectations about sex likely play a role in the harms suffered by asexuals
(as discussed in Section 5). It is also possible that these expectations could lead some
people to be mistaken about their asexuality. However, we maintain that it is better to
trust, rather than distrust, people’s testimony about their asexuality, particularly
because women are, in general, less likely to be taken seriously with regard to their
own psychology, desires, and sexual orientation than men are.
3. Sexual Desire and Sexual Attraction
To make sense of the idea that some asexual people have sex, we embraced the idea
that sexual desire is not always accompanied by sexual attraction. This idea may seem
implausible, for you might wonder what sexual desires aim at in cases where they are
not accompanied by sexual attraction. Isn’t sexual desire the desire for sexual activity
with someone else, and isn’t attraction necessary for that?
In this section, we examine asexual sexual experiences in more detail to describe the
intentional directedness of some of their typical desires. We shall then suggest that
these experiences, and the broader attempt to separate sexual desire from sexual
attraction, is more compatible with some contemporary theories of sexual desire than
it is with others.
Recent research into the masturbatory life of asexual people helps us better under-
stand the connections between desire and attraction. Although masturbation does not
involve other people, the intentional structure of people’s fantasies and desires in these
contexts helps us understand sexual desire more generally, including during partnered
sexual activity, and how it relates to sexual attraction.
In one of the best studies to date, Morag Yule and colleagues stressed that the
behaviour of asexual and allosexual people was quite similar; that, ‘nearly half of
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asexual women and three quarters of asexual men reported both experiencing sexual
fantasy and masturbating, despite reporting a lack of sexual attraction to other people
and identifying as asexual’.37 This is good additional evidence for our broad distinc-
tion between desire, arousal, and pleasure on the one hand, and sexual attraction on
the other. Several features of this research are noteworthy. First, asexual sexual desire
is often not directed towards anyone. Second, when it does have a focus, such desire
is (1) usually depersonalised and (2) focuses on situations, roles, or scenarios (we shall
call this ‘configurational’ desire).
In some cases, asexual people report that their arousal and sexual desire is ‘nondi-
rected’, i.e. it does not focus on anything or anyone.38 As an interviewee of an online
magazine put it:
I don’t so much fantasize as much as I focus on how my body is feeling and
listen to music and create a space for me to enjoy my body. It’s more about
taking the time to relax. It isn’t spontaneous; I plan when to have my ses-
sions. It’s a time to let my body and mind unwind and not focus on anything
else other than the little bubble I have for myself.39
These experiences, where bodily sensation takes centre stage, are a feature of allosex-
ual sexual life too.
Other asexual people do experience sexual desire and fantasy in a more directed
way. Here, two different participants from Yule’s study describe their fantasies:
I do have sexual fantasies but most of the time they do not involve me or any
real person. I sexually fantasize about fictional male couples and their roman-
tic and sexual relationships and events.
I don’t put myself into my fantasies. That is thoroughly unappealing to me.
Instead, I imagine other people in sexual situations, and focus on their
thoughts and feelings for a sort of vicarious arousal. I don’t want to do any-
thing sexual with any of the people I imagine, and by themselves, they don’t
turn me on.40
These descriptions are characteristic of the available literature. Two features are clear.
First, although their desire and fantasy does focus on something other than bodily sen-
sation, it is abstract and disconnected from their agential perspective.41 Indeed, in the
study of Yule et al. ‘the largest distinguishing feature between fantasies of asexual indi-
viduals compared to sexual individuals was the former’s increased likelihood of having
sexual fantasies that did not involve them’.42 Bogaert coined the term ‘autochorissexu-
ality’ to describe this kind of sexuality which involves a disconnection between the
object of someone’s desire and their sense of self.43 Second, these desires and fantasies
seem configurational; they focus on different patterns of interaction between people,
rather than on the sexual response of individuals.
This kind of desire, in which individual characteristics and genital sexuality are less
important than roles or arrangements, makes the expressions of sexual desire of some
asexual people very similar to expressions of desire in people who are interested in
specific forms of kink culture or BDSM. Indeed, asexual and allosexual people seem
to fantasise about BDSM and kink to the same extent.44 The interplay between these
two identities is likely to be complex, and in need of further research, but the parallels
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between the two further motivate our point, mentioned above, that ‘asexuality’ can be
a misleading term. Instead, what is common to asexual people and people who pursue
a kink and/or BDSM lifestyle, is that sexual desire, where present, may not be lensed
through sexual attraction, which centres on individuals, but instead is animated by
other forms of attraction and interest, e.g. to structural role configurations (dominant
and submissive), specific scenes and situations (humiliation), or towards certain kinds
of material (latex, fur).
In summary, this emerging research suggests that asexual people frequently experi-
ence sexual desire, but it is either decoupled from any interest in people, or its inten-
tional focus settles not on individuals, but on other situations. The connection
between sexual desire and sexual attraction is therefore fluid and loose.
We have not committed to a theory of sexual desire, because our primary concern
was to describe and understand how asexual people describe their sexual life. What is
clear, however, is that some contemporary accounts of what constitutes what sexual
desire is a desire for, will fare better than others when it comes to accommodating
asexuality, the distinction between sexual desire and sexual attraction, and the varia-
tion internal to sexual desire itself.
Table 2 sets out, in brief, some of the main theories of sexual desire, ordered in
terms of how complex they understand the intentionality of desire to be. Views which
suggest sexual desire is necessarily oriented towards people as individuals, like Roger
Scruton’s, will struggle to accommodate the phenomena we have mentioned above
and seem to blur together sexual attraction and sexual desire. Such blurring means
that these accounts cannot recognise asexuality, since asexuality may involve sexual
desire while lacking sexual attraction. (Although reductionist in character, if Alan
Goldman’s view regards sexual desire as focused on a specific individual (de re), as it
seems to do, it would be similarly problematic.)
Asexuality is best accommodated by accounts of sexual desire in which a person’s
individuating intentionality is either absent or viewed as a contingent feature. Pri-
moratz’s ‘plain sex’ account and Jacobson’s account are instances of the former. They
can capture cases where asexual people have sex or masturbate to experience bodily
sensations, but they will struggle to accommodate cases where an asexual person’s sex-
ual desire is oriented to fictional characters or configurations of people.
Morgan’s account of sexual desire seems to best capture the diversity of sexual
desire and its complex relationship to sexual attraction. On his view, sexual desire is
not essentially individuating, but it can assume different kinds of intentional focus
depending on the context and a person’s inclinations. In some cases, sexual desire is
desire for bodily pleasure; in others, the desire relies on ‘complex cognitive capacities
and intentional awareness, which often reach out to cultural and personal meanings
associated with individuals, objects and situations’.45 His view can therefore accommo-
date cases where sexual desire is the result of sexual attraction, cases where attraction
is absent, and cases where other kinds of attraction are playing a role.
Although we cannot argue for this here, we think the compatibility between some
accounts of sexual desire, and asexual sexuality, may serve as evidence for the plausibil-
ity of some theories of desire, particularly Morgan’s view. In itself, this is a reason why
attending to the experiences of asexual people may benefit philosophers of sexuality.
That said, we recognise it is open to critics to suggest that they have identified a dis-
tinct normative category of sexual desire which either subsumes or presupposes sexual
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attraction. Viewed in that way, sexual desire in the absence of attraction may be possi-
ble, but it would be deficient. Though we do not share that view, a full defence of the
idea is outside the scope of this article; however, we suggest what a response may look
like in the next section.
4. Forms of Attraction
Central to asexual discourse is the idea that sexual attraction can come apart from
other forms of sexual and romantic behaviour. This separation is required in order to
make sense of some asexual people’s sexual activity. A worry that this distinction may
generate is that such sexual or romantic activity is overly impersonal; that even if we
accept that sexual desire can exist, and be satisfied in the absence of sexual attraction,
any such encounter is missing something.
If we are broadly right in our analysis of attraction as an affordance-like inclination
towards things, then this worry can be expressed as the concern that asexual sexual
behaviour seems impersonal, since any sexual desires are not lensed through the expe-
rience of attraction, which helps to orient people in quick, automatic, and focused
ways to what is around them.
This worry neglects a point emphasised frequently within asexual discourse; namely,
that sexual attraction is just one form of attraction amongst others. As Julie Decker
puts it,
Plenty of nonsexual and nonromantic kinds of attraction exist, including aes-
thetic, sensual, intellectual and various kinds of emotional attraction. These
can crop up independently of each other or in association with other kinds of
attraction, and these elements can be intense, deep, and multifaceted.46
These forms of attraction can animate a life and shape someone’s orientation to other
people in the absence of any accompanying sexual attraction. Jenn, an asexual intervie-
wee in a survey conducted by Kristin Scherrer, articulates this idea clearly,
I just don’t feel sexual attraction to people. I love the human form and can
regard individuals as works of art and find people aesthetically pleasing, but I
don’t ever want to come into sexual contact with even the most beautiful of
people.47
Nora, another interviewee, describes her own attractions:
Since sexual attraction is not a factor, then it doesn’t make sense that gender
would play that much of a role in who I am attracted to. I am attracted to
personality, and when I am attracted to someone, I want to be around them,
spend time with them.48
Most human attraction is probably nonsexual. As the phenomenon of friendship illus-
trates, we can be drawn to clever, funny, beautiful, or emotionally vivacious people
and indifferent to those who lack these qualities, without being sexually or romantically
drawn to those people.49 Our attraction to people is akin to our attraction to works of
art. Some works are beautiful, we want to look at them; other works are conceptually
engaging, or emotionally provocative, but aesthetically sterile; other works might be
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tactile and invite touch. We can be drawn towards, and want to spend time with, dif-
ferent works of art without finding them attractive in the same way.
As with our analysis of sexual attraction, some of these attractions can be anchored
in existing desires or interests. Some of these may focus on projects, as when we are
drawn to someone due to a shared philosophical focus, or because they too are a com-
mitted athlete. Other attractions may stem from sensory modalities that resonate with
us, as when we are drawn to be tactile towards some people but not others, or playful
with some people, but not others.
Recognising that attraction takes different forms is important for at least three rea-
sons. In the first instance, we need to dispel the ideal that ‘attraction’ is shorthand for
specifically sexual attraction.50 As we have suggested already, we do not think people
are attracted to things simpliciter, but attracted in some respect, and sexuality is clearly
not the only respect in which we can be attracted to people. Neglect of this point has
contributed to the marginalisation and erasure of asexual experiences and is related
closely to the mistaken view of asexual sexuality, romance, and interpersonal life as
impoverished and lacking. (We return to this concern in the next section.)
Second, attention to the richness of human attraction is a key aspect of making
sense of asexual romantic life – something which seems oxymoronic to many people.
Romantic love, and romantic life in general, can be animated around experiences of
attraction which are not sexual. Many of these experiences, such as being drawn to
someone’s beauty, the comportment of their body, their distinct motility, their tactile
nature, their playfulness, and so on, are arguably integral to a more complete under-
standing of erotic life.51
Finally, awareness of attraction’s diverse forms may form one component of an
answer to the outstanding normative worries, alluded to in the section above, that sex-
ual activity in the absence of sexual attraction is (a) insufficiently individualising or
intimate of (b) insufficiently enjoyable. A critic, perhaps someone like Roger Scruton,
whose conception of sexual desire we described above, could concede that sexual
desire and sexual attraction can come apart, whilst suggesting that the latter is neces-
sary if sexual engagement with someone is not to be impersonal and potentially objec-
tifying.52 Or someone might think that sexual activity without sexual attraction cannot
be enjoyable in the right kind of ways. This is not the place to engage fully with these
normative arguments, which also apply to other forms of sexual behaviour (such as
sex work).53 However, recognition of asexual discourse around attraction, and reflec-
tion on the phenomenology of attraction, allows us to gesture to a possible response to
the worry.
We could concede, for the sake of argument, that attraction plays an important role
in individuating people in sexual and romantic life and in making relationships inti-
mate and that the world-narrowing experience of being attracted to people is an
important form of enjoyment.54 Then, in a second step, we point out that sexual
attraction is not the only form of attraction that can play this role. Other kinds of
attraction may be sufficient. We can find someone beautiful, beguiling, funny, charis-
matic, and so on, without finding them sexually attractive as such, and yet those forms
of attraction are more than enough to animate a sexual encounter and ensure that the
other person is foregrounded in one’s attention. What is more, these other forms of
attraction could be what makes sexual activity enjoyable, even in the absence of sexual
attraction.55
© 2020 The Authors. Journal of Applied Philosophy published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society for Applied
Philosophy
12 Luke Brunning and Natasha McKeever
We hope this somewhat allays another, related worry, which is that the promotion
of the idea that sexual attraction is not necessary for sex to be enjoyable could lead to
asexuals feeling pressured to engage in sexual activity which is not enjoyable to them
and that this pressure is most likely to fall along gendered lines, with allosexual men
pressurising their asexual female partners to have sex with them. To be clear, we argue
only that sex can be enjoyable in the absence of sexual attraction. No one should have
sex they do not want or do not find enjoyable.
These claims are not definitive, of course, but they do place the onus on others to
specify what is so significant about sexual attraction, in particular, such that its
absence in romantic or sexual life is cause for concern in cases where people experi-
ence other kinds of attraction.
5. Asexuality: Harm and Injustice
Although there is nothing harmful about asexuality in itself, asexual people do often
experience certain prejudices, harms, and injustice. In many cases, these harms are
linked directly to the kinds of misunderstanding about asexuality we have dispelled
earlier, e.g. that it is akin to celibacy or desire disorders. In this section, we briefly out-
line some of these harms in order to highlight the ethical issues raised by the failure to
understand asexuality or take it seriously.
We break these harms down into: (a) harms caused by the erasure of asexuality and
(b) harms caused by the denigration of asexuality. Both erasure and denigration occur
against the background of what Emens calls ‘compulsory sexuality’: ‘the pervasive cul-
tural assumption. . .that everyone is defined by some kind of sexual attraction’.56 In
addition, erasure and denigration of asexuality take place within a social context in
which there are further norms around hypersexualisation of some groups, such as gay
men, and the desexualisation of others, such as children, people with disabilities, and
the elderly.57 This social context needs to be taken into account when thinking about
how asexuality is often responded to.
5.1 Erasure
Asexuality has been pathologized extensively.58 As we outlined above, it has been
linked with ‘frigidity’ and other disorders of sexuality, meaning that, to many people,
it cannot exist as an orientation. More broadly, asexuality has been subject to perva-
sive stereotypes (for example, to be asexual is, really, to be ‘repressed’, ‘confused’, ‘se-
cretly gay’, and so on). In some contexts, this renders asexuality invisible because it is
presumed to be impossible – rather than being just something that ought not to be
(like homosexuality), it is seen as something that does not exist. This erasure is harm-
ful for several reasons; here we discuss two: hermeneutical injustice and silencing.
Firstly, it is a form of what Miranda Fricker has termed hermeneutical injustice which
is ‘the injustice of having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured
from collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective
hermeneutic resource’.59 Asexual people might struggle to make sense of their own
experiences, and nonasexual people might find it difficult to understand asexual iden-
tities, because the language to describe and interpret them is not available. If every
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time an asexual person tries to explain that they do not ever feel attracted to anyone,
they are told that they must be ‘confused’ and that there is no such thing as asexuality;
it will be almost impossible for them to make sense of their own asexuality and to have
it recognised by others for what it is.
Therefore, in order to convince people of the existence of asexuality, asexuals might
present themselves as not having any other reason for not wanting sex:
The people featured publicly as “real” asexuals are typically also white, well
educated, articulate, and comfortably middle or upper-middle class. Those of
us within the asexual/ace community know which people will be most effec-
tive at convincing a sceptical audience that asexuality exists. They are not
trans-identified, teenagers, or people with a history of abuse, even though
most trans people, most adolescents, and most people who have been subject
to abuse are not asexual. The most convincing poster child is not someone
with a physical or mental disability because people with disabilities are already
frequently denied a sexuality of their own.60
Thus, if you are White, well-educated, and middle- or upper-class people, you are
more likely to be believed if you claim to be asexual because there is no plausible ‘ex-
cuse’ for why you would not find others sexually attractive. Conversely, if others can
find an excuse from other parts of your life for why you might not find others sexually
attractive, such as that you have suffered trauma or that others will not likely find you
sexually attractive, they are more likely to disbelieve that you are really asexual. Asex-
ual people with histories of abuse or disabilities, therefore, might find it almost impos-
sible to convince others that they are asexual.
Emens quotes an asexual woman who has listed what she sees as the ‘top ten most
common misconceptions’ about asexuals:
(10) “You hate men.”
(9) “You can’t get a man.”
(8) “You have a hormone problem.”
(7) “You’re overly involved in your busy life.”
(6) “You just never had me in your bed.”
(5) “You are afraid of getting into a relationship.”
(4) “You were sexually abused as a child.”
(3) “You are a lesbian.”
(2) “You just haven’t met the right guy.”
(1) “You just got out of a bad relationship.”61
Emens writes that these sorts of comments ‘plague many asexuals’, and she also notes
some of them, such as ‘you just haven’t met the right guy’ are very similar, or indeed
the same, as those made about homosexuals and bisexuals.62 She also draws parallels
between the erasure of asexuality through these kinds of assumptions and the erasure
of bisexuality (people, for example, sometimes assume that bisexuals just haven’t come
out as gay yet or are in denial). The erasure of asexuality no doubt has an impact on
the number of people who identify as asexual. Although approximately 1% of people
surveyed by Bogaert said they had never felt sexually attracted to anyone, a smaller
percentage of people actually identify as asexual. This could be, in part at least,
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because many people simply haven’t heard of asexuality or ever met anyone who iden-
tifies as asexual.63
Secondly, in the context of romantic and sexual negotiation, the erasure of asexual-
ity generates a kind of silencing which makes it impossible to refuse sexual advances
(and be free of harassment) on the grounds of asexuality. It’s not just ‘no means yes’,
but that ‘no’ is not heard. This is shown quite clearly in the ‘top ten misconceptions’
above. Following the refusal of a sexual advance on the grounds of asexuality with
something like ‘you’ve just never had me in your bed’ makes a clear statement that the
refuser is either not being heard or not being believed about their asexuality. In the
worst cases, this can lead to sexual assault, and Julie Decker writes that asexuals are at
a higher risk of ‘corrective rape’.64 She herself, after discussing her asexuality on You-
Tube, has been told that she ‘just needs a good raping’.65
5.2. Denigration
Even if asexuality is accepted as possible in some minimal sense, in some contexts,
asexuals might still find that their struggles are not taken seriously. Emens quotes the
sex columnist, Dan Savage, who said in an interview for a documentary about asexual-
ity:
It’s funny to think about. You know, you’ve got the gays marching for the
right to be cocksucking homosexuals, and then you have the asexuals march-
ing for the right to – not do anything. Which is hilarious. Look, you didn’t
need to march for that right. You just need to stay home, and not do any-
thing.66
Although, as Emens acknowledges, asexuals have not been punished by the law in a
comparable way to homosexuals, they are nonetheless discriminated against. Indeed,
she cites research that suggests that heterosexuals perhaps show even greater bias
towards asexuals than towards homosexuals and bisexuals.67 Indeed, the lack of recog-
nition of the prejudice and discrimination faced by asexuals further compounds the
prejudice.
Furthermore, asexuality is often denigrated as ‘immaturity’, a ‘waste of potential’, or
‘a pitiful existence’. Developing one’s sexuality is seen as a crucial part of becoming
an adult, with people who remain virgins beyond their teenage years sometimes being
viewed with a degree of suspicion or pity. For asexuals who have never had sex, they
might find that people demand an explanation as to why, feel sorry for them, and hope
that they change their minds so that they can experience sex.
Jessica Begon provides a good example of how even the most liberally minded
philosophers can assume that sexual satisfaction is a necessary part of a life well-lived.
She explains how Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach – an approach to think-
ing about wellbeing in terms of opportunities to perform certain functionings – leaves
out asexual people because Nussbaum ‘includes “having opportunities for sexual satis-
faction” as part of the capability for bodily integrity’.68 For Nussbaum, what is impor-
tant is not just that sexual activity is performed, but that it is done for the right
reasons, i.e. for sexual satisfaction. However, as Begon notes, some asexuals ‘will be
incapable of sexual satisfaction’ or simply not desire it. As Nussbaum seeks to develop
a list of central capabilities by overlapping consensus, then asexual people pose a
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problem for her approach, since in no hypothetical future scenario will (some) asexu-
als agree that opportunities for sexual satisfaction will be necessary for their life to go
well. Thus, Begon argues, Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach asks asexual individuals
to agree that the ability to perform a functioning of which they are incapable is essen-
tial to any dignified life.69 Of course, Nussbaum could take ‘opportunities for sexual
satisfaction’ out of her list, but our point here is not to analyse Nussbaum’s or indeed
any Capabilities Approach to wellbeing. Rather, what this example shows is how wide-
spread the view is that sexual satisfaction is part of a life well-lived, and thus how diffi-
cult it can be for asexuals to argue that their life is not deficient because it does not
involve sexual attraction.
Both common attitudes towards sexuality and more philosophical elaborations of
them presuppose that sexual expression, and eventual competence and liberation, is
integral to human flourishing.70 These attitudes are typically teleological: sexual matu-
rity is regarded as a developmental goal, and they often retain a narrow conception of
what human sexuality involves.
Instead of assuming that sexuality is central to human life, however, and merely dis-
puting its proper limits, we can critique this assumption itself. For some asexual peo-
ple, sexuality is not central to their flourishing lives. As we have also seen in our
discussion of sexual attraction and sexual desire, attention to the experiences of asexu-
als who do have sex also broadens our understanding of sexuality. So not only is sexu-
ality not necessary to flourish, but the range of sexuality that might contribute to a
specific person’s flourishing, is itself broader than people suppose.
Some asexuals might find that their intimate life as a whole is pathologized, viewed
as deficient, or not taken seriously. Asexual people who identify as homoromantic or
biromantic might face disbelief that their identity is ‘possible’ because homosexuality
and bisexuality are frequently oversexualised. For aromantic asexuals, amatonormativ-
ity – the social prioritisation of romantic love over other kinds of caring relationship71–
will have a negative impact on how seriously their nonromantic caring relationships
will be taken. Amatonormativity is also a problem for romantic asexuals too, because
asexual romantic relationships might be conflated with friendships, and friendship is
devalued because of amatornomativity. The view that marriage must involve sex brings
marriage and asexuality into tension. This tension exists formally in many jurisdic-
tions, like the United Kingdom and some states of America, where opposite-sex mar-
riages are considered ‘voidable’ and can be annulled if they are unconsummated’.72
People who do not want to have sex are thus defined out of nonvoidable marriage,
which is arguably harmful if marriage is viewed as a way of expressing and supporting
committed romantic love.
Asexual people may also be regarded with suspicion for other reasons, which we can
only allude to here. First, when sexuality is so central to modern life, various kinds of
refusal, resistance, or reticence can seem radical, even dangerous. Asexuals may relate
uneasily to attempts to use sexual attraction or desire to sell consumer goods or state-
supported procreative sex. It might also be supposed that since asexual people do not
have to manage sexual attraction or activity, they are therefore free from patriarchal
spheres of control which rely on such dimensions of sexuality. Second, given the cen-
tral importance attributed to sexual attraction in modern life, and the reduction of all
attractions to sexual attraction, the absence of sexual attraction may be mistaken for
dispassionateness, or a lack of concern for others.
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These suspicions are often tinged with patronising envy: ‘at least you don’t have to
deal with unwanted attention.’ But they are mistaken. Although it is true that asexual
experience does help cast a critical perspective on many social norms and institutions,
their experiences are diverse as any other group. Some asexual people will struggle
with sexual desire or other forms of attraction; some will have children; some will
embrace consumerism or political conservatism. As we have seen, too, oppression
does not track sexual attraction, and in many cases, patriarchal rage is more pro-
nounced when people identify as asexual.
As with any social denigration, asexual oppression will intersect with, and com-
pound, other forms of prejudice, and discrimination may compound. Additional
stereotypes of hypersexual masculinity, or pathologized desexualisation, can make it
especially hard for certain groups, e.g. Black men or disabled women, to be corrobo-
rated in their identity as asexual. Or a queer-romantic asexual woman may find them-
selves experiencing accentuated male anger. For not only are they unavailable to men
in virtue of the specific trajectory of their sexual attractions, as with other queer
women, their asexuality means they might be sexually unavailable simpliciter, not even
as the object of heterosexual fantasy.
6. Conclusion
Our aim in this article was to provide the beginnings of an account of asexuality in
order to start addressing its practical and theoretical neglect. We accepted several
commonly held claims about asexuality: that asexuality is defined as the absence of
sexual attraction; that some asexual people experience sexual desire and may have sex;
that attraction is more diverse than just sexual attraction; and that asexual people
experience prejudice and harm. Our account was shaped by some similarities between
asexual experiences and other forms of minority sexual expression, such as BDSM,
and by the guiding intimation that both romantic life, and human sexuality, are much
more complex and richly animated than most theoretical treatments suppose.
We explained how sexual attraction and sexual desire can differ by giving an affor-
dance-like account of the former. With that distinction in hand, we then suggested
that some philosophical theories of sexual desire can accommodate asexual experi-
ences more easily than others, i.e. those which do not require sexual desire to be
intentionally focused on a specific person. We then argued that closer attention to the
other forms of attraction people experience can help rebuff objections levelled at asex-
ual romance: that romantic relationships require sexual attraction or that asexual sex-
ual activity must be insufficiently focused on a specific person and thus be potentially
objectifying or harmful. Finally, we explained how asexual people suffer persistent
hermeneutical injustice and the harmful erasure or denigration of their experiences.
In our hypersexualised society, it can be easy to overlook or downplay the experi-
ences of asexual people. Philosophically, this oversight may be exacerbated by attempts
to resuscitate the philosophy of love and to think more about sexual life. But to disre-
gard asexuality is to produce incomplete or inaccurate accounts of sexuality and
romantic life. More disturbingly, this neglect perpetuates serious harm to asexual peo-
ple.
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Fundamentally, people love, care about, are attracted to, and experience pleasure
with other people in copious ways. Romantic flourishing is also varied. Wider
acknowledgment of these facts is required urgently, in the academy and beyond.73
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